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TWO EXTENSIONS OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE
GAMES
T.S.H. DRIESSEN AND D. PAULUSMA
ABSTRACT. Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider
a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as
the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley
value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In
the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a
core-allocation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider the problem of allocating some overall costs among a number of agents
who have undertaken a joint venture. This allocation problem may be solved in a
variety of ways, but an allocation rule that prescribes somehow a solution for the
allocation problem should be justifiable on the basis of generally accepted princi-
ples. A well-known solution of cooperative games is the Shapley value (cf. Shap-
ley [1953], Roth [1988]).
A cooperative game is described by a pair .N; c/, where N is a finite set of n  2
players and c : 2N ! R is a cost function satisfying c.;/ D 0.
As mentioned above, a central problem in cooperative game theory is to find a
’fair’ allocation of the total costs c.N / to the players. A vector x 2 RN is a cost
allocation if x is efficient, i.e., x.N / D c.N /. (Throughout the paper, for any x 2
RN and S  N , we use the shorthand notation x.S/ D
X
i2S
xi.)
An allocation rule  prescribes for each cooperative n-person game .N; c/ exactly
one allocation. The Shapley value of a game .N; c/ is defined as
i.N; c/D
X
SN;
S3i
.jSj − 1/!.n− jSj/!
n!

c.S/− c.Sni/

for all i 2 N:(1.1)
In this note, we also a (partial) order on the set of players (see, e.g., Bilbao and
Edelman [1996], Faigle and Kern [1992], [1997]). Denote this partial order by
P D .N;/. Then a cooperative game is described by a pair .P; c/. Furthermore,
we slightly generalize the model by assuming c to be given for a subfamily L .P/
2N of permitted coalitions containing the grand coalition N .
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Besides the subfamily L .P/D 2N , we consider examples of subfamilies L .P/ (cf.
Faigle and Kern [1992]) such as
.1:2/ L .P/ D fS  N j if j 2 S then i 2 S for all i  jgI
.1:3/ L .P/ D fS  N j if i; j 2 S then k 2 S for all i  k  jg:
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the characterization of the Shapley
value by Evans [1996] is generalized. Evans [1996] has proposed a specifically
chosen probabilistic framework based on a certain “uniform” probability distribu-
tion. In this framework, the Shapley value has been characterized as the unique
consistent allocation, where consistency refers to a particular property described
in this section. We generalize Evans’ result in that the existence and uniqueness
of the consistent solution is established within a similar, but less restrictive proba-
bilistic framework. Furthermore, we consider the case in which the set of players is
(partially) ordered. However, it turns out that only subfamilies L .P/ that contain
also the complement of permitted coalitions can be considered. Hence the results
do not hold for subfamilies L .P/ such as (1.2) and (1.3). Therefore, in Section
3, we propose another generalization of the Shapley value by an extension of the
recursive formula for the Shapley value introduced by Sprumont [1990]. We show
that this generalized Shapley value is a core-allocation for quasi-concave games.
2. THE UNIFIED PROBABILISTIC MODEL AND CONSISTENT ALLOCATIONS
The solution approach taken here is that the solution of the game is to be deter-
mined endogenously as the expected outcome of a probabilistic reduction of the
cooperative n-person game to various induced two-person games. For that purpose
the player set N is to be partitioned into two complementary coalitions S and NnS,
and from each of these two coalitions a leader (“representative”) has to be cho-
sen to cope with the bilateral division problem how to divide the total costs c.N /,
taking into account the costs c.S/ and c.NnS/ of the two coalitions involved. It
is supposed that any bilateral division problem is solved by applying the so-called
standard solution in that the surplus c.N /− c.S/− c.NnS/ is charged equally to
both leaders of the two coalitions, in addition to their initial costs. That is, the
leader of coalition S is charged the amount of c.S/C 12 [c.N /− c.S/− c.NnS/]
and subsequently, this leader i is obliged to charge all other agents j, j 2 Snfig, of
his coalition the amount x j in accordance with the prespecified cost vector x 2 RN ,
and the remaining costs are allocated to the leader himself.
Since the model supposes that players split randomly into two coalitions, each
with a randomly chosen leader, let p.S; NnS/  0 denote the probability of the
formation of the ordered partition .S; NnS/ and pSi  0 the probability that player
i will be leader of coalition S, where S ( N , S 6D ;, and i 2 S. In this probabilistic
framework, the expected cost allocation to player i in the cooperative game .N; c/
with reference to the cost vector x is determined by the next expression:
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X
S(N;
S3i
2p.S; NnS/

.1− pSi /xi C pSi

c.N /C c.S/− c.NnS/
2
− x.Sni/

:(2.1)
The factor 2 arises in (2.1) because it is supposed that the ordered partitions .S; NnS/
and .NnS; S/ being equally likely, that is p.S; NnS/ D p.NnS; S/ for all S ( N ,
S 6D ;. Since the probabilistic model involves a probability distribution fp.S; NnS/ j
S ( N; S 6D ;g over the finite set of ordered partitions of the player set and var-
ious probability distributions f.pSi /i2Sg, S ( N , S 6D ;, concerning leaders within
coalitions as well, we make use of the following two assumptions:
(P1) P
S(N;
S6D;
p.S; NnS/D 1 or equivalently, P
S(N;
S3i
2p.S; NnS/D 1 for all i 2 N;
(P2) P
i2S
pSi D 1 for all S ( N , S 6D ;.
Let .N; c/ be a cooperative n-person game. An allocation x 2 RN is said to be
consistent (with respect to the underlying probabilistic framework) if there is no
inconsistency in what each of the players will be charged, either according to x or
his expected outcome as given by (2.1). That is, x is a consistent allocation if and
only if x.N / D c.N / and the following holds: for all i 2 N
P
S(N;
S3i
2p.S; NnS/.1− pSi /xi C pSi (c.N /C c.S/− c.NnS/2 − x.Sni/ D xi
or equivalently (due to (P1)),X
S(N;
S3i
2p.S; NnS/pSi

c.N /C c.S/− c.NnS/
2
− x.S/

D 0 for all i 2 N .(2.2)
Under one additional assumption on the relevant probability distributions, the next
theorem states the existence and uniqueness of a consistent allocation. Further, an
explicit formula for the consistent allocation is presented. The additional assump-
tion takes into account the probability that a fixed player will be leader of coalitions
containing another variable player and requires that these probabilities are the same
for all variable players.
(P3) for all i 2 N P
S(N;
Sfi; jg
p.S; NnS/pSi is constant for all j 2 Nni.
Let pi :D
P
S(N;
S3i
p.S; NnS/pSi represent the probability that player i will be leader.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that fp.S; NnS/ j S ( N; S 6D ;g and f.pSi /i2Sg, S ( N,
S 6D ;, satisfy (P1), (P2) and (P3). Let .N; c/ be a cooperative n-person game.
Then there exists a unique consistent allocation x 2 RN and it is given, for all
i 2 N, by
xi D

1− .n− 1/pi

c.N /C .n− 1/
X
S(N;
S3i
p.S; NnS/pSi

c.S/− c.NnS/:(2.3)
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Proof: In view of assumption (P3) we write
Npi :D
X
S(N;
Sfi; jg
p.S; NnS/pSi for all i 2 N and all j 2 Nni.(2.4)
Let .N; c/ be a cooperative game, i 2 N and x 2 RN a cost allocation for the
game .N; c/. By some careful, but straightforward combinatorial computations
concerning some double sum, we arrive at the following chain of equalities:
X
S(N;
S3i
2p.S; NnS/pSi x.S/
D
X
S(N;
S3i
2p.S; NnS/pSi xi C
X
S(N;
S3i
2p.S; NnS/pSi
X
j2Sni
x j
D 2pixi C 2
X
j2Nni
x j
X
S(N;
Sfi; jg
p.S; NnS/pSi (by definition of pi)
D 2pixi C 2x.Nni/ Npi (by definition of Npi, see (2.4))
D 2pixi C 2 [c.N /− xi] Npi (by efficiency of x)
D 2 pi − Npi xi C 2 Npic.N /:
Hence the consistency constraint (2.2) for the allocation x reduces to the following
equality: for all i 2 N
X
S(N;
S3i
p.S; NnS/pSi

c.S/− c.NnS/C pi − 2 Npi c.N / D 2 pi − Npi xi:
In order to deduce (2.3) from the latter equality, it remains to establish that pi − Npi D
1
2.n−1/ for all i 2 N . Actually, we claim that the following results hold:
X
i2N
pi D 1I
X
j2Nni
Np j D 12 − pi and pi − Npi D
1
2.n− 1/ for all i 2 N .
(2.5)
To prove the first statement in (2.5), some straightforward combinatorial compu-
tations concerning some double sum and applying the assumptions (P2) and (P1)
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respectively, yield the following chain of equalities:X
i2N
pi D
X
i2N
X
S(N;
S3i
p.S; NnS/pSi .reverse the order of the double sum/
D
X
S(N;
S6D;
p.S; NnS/
X
i2S
pSi
.P2/D
X
S(N;
S6D;
p.S; NnS/  1
.P1/D 1:
To prove the second statement in (2.5), a similar reasoning, for all i 2 N , yields the
following chain of equalities:
X
j2Nni
Np j .2:4/D
X
j2Nni
X
S(N;
Sfi; jg
p.S; NnS/pSj .reverse the order of the double sum/
D
X
S(N;
S3i
p.S; NnS/
X
j2Sni
pSj
.P2/D
X
S(N;
S3i
p.S; NnS/ 1− pSi 
.P1/D 12 − pi (by definition of pi).
From the obtained equalities
P
j2N p j D 1 and
P
j2N Np j D 12 − piC Npi, we deduce
that
P
j2N

p j − Np j
 D 12 C pi − Npi for all i 2 N . It follows immediately that
pi − Npi D 12.n−1/ for all i 2 N . That is, (2.5) holds which completes the full proof
of the theorem.
}
The following corollary presents the result by Evans [1996]. The straightforward
proof is left to the reader.
Corollary 2.1. Let the “uniform” probability distribution fp.S; NnS/ j S( N; S 6D
;g be given by p.S; NnS/ :D .n− 1/  ( njSj−1 for all S ( N, S 6D ;, and moreover,
let pSi :D 1jSj for all S ( N, S 6D ;, and i 2 S. Then (P1), (P2) and (P3) hold and
the unique consistent allocation x 2 RN for a cooperative game .N; c/ agrees with
the Shapley value, i.e., (2.3) reduces to
xi D
X
SN;
S3i
.jSj − 1/!.n− jSj/!
n!

c.S/− c.NnS/

;(2.6)
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which is equivalent to (1.1).
In the rest of this section, we suppose that (P1), (P2) and (P3) hold. Define the
consistent allocation rule as the rule that assigns to every cooperative game .N; c/
its unique consistent allocation as given by (2.3). We say the consistent allocation
rule possesses the dummy player property if for every cooperative game .N; c/,
the consistent allocation x 2 RN satisfies xi D c.fig/ for every dummy player i in
the game .N; c/. Here player i is called a dummy if c.S/− c.Sni/ D c.fig/ for all
S  N with i 2 S.
The next theorem presents two characterizations of the dummy player property to
hold true for the consistent allocation rule. A first characterization refers to nec-
essary and sufficient conditions on the underlying probability distributions stating
that the probability of a player’s leadership within a nontrivial coalition (with ref-
erence to the corresponding ordered partition of the player set) is the same for both
the coalition and its complementary coalition enlarged with the given player. The
second characterization requires the consistent allocation rule to be a probabilistic
marginalistic allocation rule (cf. Weber [1988]) in that the allocation to any player
is some expected outcome of his marginal contributions in the game. Note that the
Shapley value is an example of a consistent allocation rule that satisfies the dummy
player property.
Proposition 2.1. For any coalition S  N and any player i 2 N with i 2 S, de-
fine the “enlarged” complementary coalition ScCi to be .NnS/ [ fig. Then the
following three statements are equivalent.
(D1) The consistent allocation rule possesses the dummy player property.
(D2) The underlying probability distributions satisfy the next conditions:
p.S; NnS/pSi D p.ScCi; NnScCi/pS
cCi
i whenever fig ( S ( N;
p.fig; Nni/  pfigi D 1n−1 − pi for all i 2 N.
(D3) The consistent allocation rule is a probabilistic marginalistic allocation rule,
that is, for every i 2 N, there exists a collection of non-negative real numbers
fqSi j S  N; S 3 ig satisfying
P
SN;
S3i
qSi D 1 such that, for every cooperative
game .N; c/, the consistent allocation xi to any player i is of the following
form:
xi D
X
SN;
S3i
qSi

c.S/− c.Sni/:
Proof:
(a) (D1) implies (D2).
Suppose the consistent allocation rule possesses the dummy player property. Let
S  N and i 2 N with i 2 S, S 6D fig. Define the cooperative game .N; Nc/ by
Nc.S/ :D 1, Nc.Sni/ :D 1 and Nc.T / :D 0 otherwise. Clearly, player i is a dummy in
the game .N; Nc/. Denote the consistent allocation of the game .N; Nc/ by x 2 RN
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as given by (2.3). The dummy player property of the consistent allocation rule
yields xi D Nc.fig/ D 0. However, by (2.3), xi can be determined as follows by
distinguishing two cases:
xi D 1− .n− 1/pi − .n− 1/p.fig; Nni/pfigi if S D N
xi D .n− 1/

p.S; NnS/pSi − p.ScCi; NnScCi/pS
cCi
i

if S 6D N:
From this, together with xi D 0, we conclude that (D1) implies (D2).
(b) (D2) implies (D3).
Suppose (D2) holds. Then for all i 2 N the following chain of equalities holds.X
S(N;
fig(S
p.S; NnS/pSi

c.S/− c.NnS/
.D2/D 12
X
S(N;
fig(S
p.S; NnS/pSi

c.S/− c.NnS/C c.ScCi/− c.NnScCi/
D 12
X
S(N;
fig(S
p.S; NnS/pSi

c.S/− c.Sni/C c.ScCi/− c.ScCini/
.D2/D
X
S(N;
fig(S
p.S; NnS/pSi

c.S/− c.Sni/:
Using this partial result, we deduce by straightforward calculations that, for all
i 2 N the consistent allocation xi as given by (2.3) reduces as follows:
xi
.2:3/D 1− .n− 1/pi c.N /C .n− 1/X
S(N;
S3i
p.S; NnS/pSi

c.S/− c.NnS/
D 1− .n− 1/pi c.N /C .n− 1/p.fig; Nni/pfigi c.fig/− c.Nni/
C .n− 1/
X
S(N;
fig(S
p.S; NnS/pSi

c.S/− c.Sni/
.D2/D 1− .n− 1/pi c.N /− c.Nni/
C .n− 1/
X
S(N;
S3i
p.S; NnS/pSi

c.S/− c.Sni/:
Hence, for all i 2 N the consistent allocation xi is of the form given by (D3) by
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choosing qiS :D .n− 1/p.S; NnS/pSi for all S ( N with i 2 S and qiN :D 1− .n−
1/pi. Note that for all i 2 N , by definition of pi,X
SN;
S3i
qiS D .n− 1/
X
S(N;
S3i
p.S; NnS/pSi C qiN D .n− 1/pi C qiN D 1:
This completes the proof of (b).
(c) (D3) implies (D1).
This implication is trivial by the definition of a dummy player and the assumption
on the collection fqSi j S  N; S 3 ig for any player i 2 N .
}
Up to now, we have only treated the case in which the set of players was unordered.
Let L .P/ be a subfamily of permitted coalitions depending on a poset PD .N;/.
Within our probabilistic framework, this can be modelled by making the probabil-
ity p.S; NnS/ equal to zero whenever S or NnS =2 L .P/. It is clear that we have
to make the following assumption:
(C) S 2 L .P/ if and only if NnS 2 L .P/ for all S  N .
As an extra condition one could decide that only a player i 2 S for which there does
not exist a player j 2 S with j  i can be leader of S. This can be modelled by
making the probability pSj equal to zero for all players j 2 S for which there exists
a player k 2 S with j  k. If the (adjusted) probability distributions fp.S; NnS/ j
S ( N; S 6D ;g and f.pSi /i2Sg, S ( N , S 6D ; satisfy the conditions (P1), (P2) and
(P3), the results presented in this section stay valid.
However, subfamilies L .P/ such as (1.2) and (1.3) do not satisfy (C). Therefore,
in the next section, we propose another approach that also yields a generalized
Shapley value.
3. THE RECURSIVE SHAPLEY VALUE
In this section, the recursive formula for the Shapley value presented by Spru-
mont [1990] is treated. This formula has only been defined for cooperative games
.P; c/ where L .P/D 2N . We give a generalization of this formula that holds for a
larger class of subfamilies L .P/.
Consider a coalition T  N and restrict the cost function c : 2N ! R to 2T . A
vector x 2 RT is called a cost allocation if x.T / D c.T /.
The Shapley value of a game .T; c/ is defined as
i.T; c/ D
X
ST;
S3i
.jSj − 1/!.jT j − jSj/!
jT j!

c.S/− c.Sni/

for all i 2 T:(3.1)
Sprumont [1990] proved the following recursive formula for the Shapley value of
a game .T; c/ for all non-empty coalitions T  N .
i.T; c/ D 1jT j

c.T /− c.Tni/C
X
j2Tni
i.Tn j; c/

for all i 2 T:(3.2)
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Consider a subfamily L .P/. A player i is called unrestricted in a coalition S 2
L .P/ if L .P/ contains Sni. Denote the set of unrestricted players in S by S, i.e.,
S D f i 2 S j Sni 2 L .P/ g. We make use of the following assumption.
(A) S is non-empty for all S 2 L .P/n;.
Because of this assumption, a coalition T 2 L .P/ exists for every size 0 jT j  n.
A poset .T;/, where T is a permitted coalition, is obtained from P in the fol-
lowing way: i  j in .T;/ if and only if i  j in P. Let L ..T;// be the sub-
family of permitted coalitions restricted to .T;/, i.e., L ..T;// D 2T \ L .P/.
An allocation rule  prescribes for each cooperative game ..T;/; c/ exactly one
allocation. We use the notations L .T / instead of L ..T;// and, for an allocation
rule  ,  .T; c/ instead of  ..T;/; c/ if the structural context is clear.
It is easy to see that, besides L .P/ D 2N , (1.2) and (1.3) also satisfy (A). Note
that in (1.2), S D SC and in (1.3), S D SC [ S−, where SC denotes the set of
maximal players and S− denotes the set of minimal players. A player i 2 S is called
maximal in S if there does not exist a player j 2 S with j  i. A player i 2 S is
called minimal in S if there does not exist a player j 2 S with j  i.
From now on, we only consider subfamilies L .P/ containing N that satisfy (A).
Consider a fixed game .P; c/. For all T 2L .P/, we define the vector r.T; c/2RT
as
ri .T; c/ D
X
S2L .T /;
S3i
.T; S/

c.S/− c.Sni/

for all i 2 T;(3.3)
where for all T 2 L .P/; S 2 L .T /; S 6D ;, the coefficients .T; S/ are recursively
given by
.T; S/ D
8>>><>>>:
1
jTj if S D T
1
jTj
X
j2TnS
.Tn j; S/ otherwise.
(3.4)
Before proving that r is an allocation rule, we first show that r is a generalization
of the Shapley value.
Proposition 3.1. For all T 2 L .P/; T 6D ;, r.T; c/D .T; c/ if L .T / D 2T .
Proof: First note that S D S for all S  T if L .T / D 2T . Hence, by (3.1), it
suffices to show that
.T; S/D .jT j − jSj/!.jSj − 1/!jT j! for all S  T; S 6D ;:
By assumption (A), we can use induction on jT j. Note that L .S/D 2S for all S T
if L .T / D 2T .
If jT j D 1 then .T; T /D 1. Suppose jT j > 1. We have, by definition,
.T; T /D 1jT j D
.jT j − jT j/!.jT j − 1/!
jT j! :
10 T.S.H. DRIESSEN AND D. PAULUSMA
If S ( T; S 6D ;, we have
.T; S/ D 1jT j
X
j2TnS
.Tn j; S/
D
X
j2TnS
.jT j − jSj − 1/!.jSj − 1/!
.jT j − 1/!jT j
D .jT j − jSj/!.jSj − 1/!jT j! :
}
In the following theorem, we show that r.T; c/ is a cost allocation for all T 2
L .P/. Furthermore, ri .T; c/ can easily be computed for all T 2 L .P/; T 6D ;
if ri .Tn j; c/ is known for all j 2 Tni. It turns out that if i is an unrestricted
player in the permitted coalition T , ri .T; c/ is the sum of the marginal contribution
c.T /− c.Tni/ and the cost allocations to i in the games .Tn j; c/, where j 6D i is
also an unrestricted player in T , divided by the number of unrestricted players in
T . If i 2 T is not an unrestricted player, ri .T; c/ is simply the average of the cost
allocations to i in the games with one unrestricted player less. Therefore, we call
r the Recursive Shapley value (see also Proposition 3.1).
Theorem 3.1. For all T 2 L .P/; T 6D ;, r.T; c/ is an allocation that can be
determined recursively by
ri .T; c/ D
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1
jTj

c.T /− c.Tni/C
X
j2Tni
ri .Tn j; c/
 for all i 2 T
1
jTj
X
j2T
ri .Tn j; c/ for all i 2 TnT:
(3.5)
Proof: First we will prove that the recursive form holds. This will be done by some
combinatorial computations concerning some double sum.
Suppose T 2 L .P/ and i 2 T . There are two cases.
(a) i 2 T:
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We have
ri .T; c/
.3:3/D
X
S2L .T /;
S3i
.T; S/

c.S/− c.Sni/
.3:4/D 1jTj

c.T /− c.Tni/C X
S2L .T /nT;
S3i
1
jTj
X
j2TnS
.Tn j; S/c.S/− c.Sni/
D 1jTj

c.T /− c.Tni/C X
j2Tni
1
jTj
X
S2L .Tn j/
S3i
.Tn j; S/c.S/− c.Sni/
.3:3/D 1jTj

c.T /− c.Tni/C
X
j2Tni
ri .Tn j; c/

:
(b) i 2 TnT:
We have
ri .T; c/
.3:3/D
X
S2L .T /;
S3i
.T; S/

c.S/− c.Sni/
.3:4/D
X
S2L .T /;
S3i
1
jTj
X
j2TnS
.Tn j; S/c.S/− c.Sni/
D
X
j2T
1
jTj
X
S2L .Tn j/
S3i
.Tn j; S/c.S/− c.Sni/
.3:3/D 1jTj
X
j2T
ri .Tn j; c/:
We finish the proof by showing that for all T 2 L .P/; T 6D ;, r.T; c/ is a cost
allocation. By assumption (A), induction on the coalition size jT j is allowed. If
T D fig, ri .T; c/ D c.T /. Suppose jT j > 1. We can use the recursive form as
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follows:
X
i2T
ri .T; c/
.3:5/D
X
i2T
1
jTj

c.T /− c.Tni/C
X
j2Tni
ri .Tn j; c/

C
X
i2TnT
1
jTj
X
j2T
ri .Tn j; c/
D c.T /− 1jTj
X
i2T
c.Tni/C
X
i2T
1
jTj
X
j2Tni
ri .Tn j; c/
D c.T /− 1jTj
X
i2T
c.Tni/C
X
j2T
1
jTj
X
i2Tn j
ri .Tn j; c/
D c.T /− 1jTj
X
i2T
c.Tni/C 1jTj
X
j2T
c.Tn j/
D c.T /:
}
Note that in case L .T /D 2T , where T 2 L .P/n;, (3.5) changes into (3.2). More-
over, in case L .T /D fS T j if j 2 S then i 2 S for all i  jg, where T 2L .P/n;,
the Recursive Shapley value does not coincide with the Shapley value under prece-
dence constraints introduced by Faigle and Kern [1992].
Proposition 3.2 states that the Recursive Shapley value is a probabilistic marginal-
istic allocation rule in that the allocation to any player is some expected outcome
of his marginal contributions in the game.
Proposition 3.2. r is a probabilistic marginalistic allocation rule, that is, for
all T 2 L .P/; S 2 L .T /; S 6D ;, the coefficients .T; S/ are positive and for all
T 2 L .P/; i 2 T, P
S2L .T /;
S3i
.T; S/D 1.
Proof: It is straightforward to see that the real numbers .T; S/ are positive for all
T 2 L .P/; S 2 L .T /; S 6D ;. To prove that for all T 2 L .P/; i 2 T ,P
S2L .T /;
S3i
.T; S/D 1, we use induction on the coalition size jT j which is allowed by
assumption (A). If T D fig, then .T; T / D 1. Suppose T 2 L .P/; jT j > 1 and
i 2 T . There are two cases.
(a) i 2 T:
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We haveX
S2L .T /;
S3i
.T; S/ D .T; T /C
X
S2L .T /nT;
S3i
.T; S/
.3:4/D 1jTj C
1
jTj
X
S2L .T /nT;
S3i
X
j2TnS
.Tn j; S/
D 1jTj C
X
j2Tni
1
jTj
X
S2L .Tn j/
S3i
.Tn j; S/
D 1jTj C
X
j2Tni
1
jTj (by the induction hypothesis)
D 1:
(b) i 2 TnT:
We haveX
S2L .T /;
S3i
.T; S/ .3:4/D 1jTj
X
S2L .T /;
S3i
X
j2TnS
.Tn j; S/
D
X
j2T
1
jTj
X
S2L .Tn j/
S3i
.Tn j; S/
D
X
j2T
1
jTj (by the induction hypothesis)
D 1:
}
As mentioned in the introduction, a cost allocation should be “fair” in some sense.
A possible way to define fair allocations is to demand that they are in the core of
a cooperative game. The idea of the core of a game essentially goes back to von
Neumann and Morgenstern [1944]. core(N; c) is the set of all allocations x 2 RN
for which there is no coalition S  N such that x.S/ > c.S/, which means that
no coalition should have to pay more than its cost. It turns out that the Shapley
value lies not in the core for a general cooperative game. However, for the class of
the so-called quasi-convex games, Sprumont [1990] proved that the Shapley value
belongs to the core.
In our generalized model, for a given subfamily L .P/, we define
core.P; c/D f x 2 RN j x.N / D c.N / and x.S/  c.S/ for all S 2 L .P/nN g:
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We make one extra assumption to hold for a subfamily L .P/. It is straightforward
to see that, besides L .P/ D 2N , (1.2) and (1.3) also satisfy this assumption.
(B) S \ T  S for all T 2 L .P/; S 2 L .T /.
A cooperative game .P; c/ is called quasi-concave ifX
i2S\T

c.S/− c.Sni/  X
i2S\T

c.T /− c.Tni/ for all T 2 L .P/; S 2 L .T /:
Clearly, this definition corresponds with the original definition of quasi-convexity
as given by Sprumont [1990] if L .P/D 2N . Note that, because of assumption (B),
Sni 2 L .P/ for all T 2 L .P/; S 2 L .T / and i 2 S \ T.
In the following theorem, we generalize the result of Sprumont [1990] for subfam-
ilies L .P/ not necessarily equal to 2N . The recursive formula of r turns out to be
very useful in the proof.
Theorem 3.2. Let L .P/ be a subfamily that satisfies assumption (A) and (B). If
the cooperative game (P; c) is quasi-concave, then r.P; c/ 2 core(P; c).
Proof: If .P; c/ is quasi-concave, then each subgame .S; c/ is quasi-concave for
all S 2 L .P/. Furthermore, by assumption .A/, we can use induction on jNj. If
N D fig; ri .P; c/D c.fig/. Suppose n  2 and T 2 L .P/.
X
i2T
ri .P; c/
.3:5/D
X
i2N\T
1
jNj

c.N /− c.Nni/CX
i2T
1
jNj
X
j2Nni
ri .Nn j; c/
D 1jNj
X
i2N\T

c.N /− c.Nni/C 1jNj Xj2N\T
X
i2Tn j
ri .Nn j; c/
C 1jNj
X
j2NnT
X
i2T
ri .Nn j; c/
 1jNj
X
i2N\T

c.N /− c.Nni/C 1jNj Xj2N\T c.Tn j/
C 1jNj
X
j2NnT
c.T / (by (B) and the induction hypothesis)
 1jNj
X
i2N\T

c.T /− c.Tni/C 1jNj Xj2N\T c.Tn j/
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C 1jNj
X
j2NnT
c.T / (by quasi-concavity of .P; c//
D 1jNj
jN \ T j C jNnT jc.T /
D c.T /:
}
In Paulusma [1997], more information on the two extensions of the Shapley value
can be found. For which poset structures, there exist efficient algorithms for the
deterministic evaluation of these values is still an open problem.
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